

THE NEOLIBERAL STATE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The connotation and composition of administrative reforms in each society are inseparable from the nature and formation of the state. The emergence of fundamental ideological and paradigmatic shift in the 1980s in development thinking from a state-centered to a market driven perspective has a significant impact on the prospects of sustainable development and administrative efficiency. This is mainly because the priorities of neoliberal policies are to expand market forces, facilitate open competition, enhance mass production, attract foreign investment, and maximize consumption. By 1986, the Babangida regime adopted the World Bank/IMF inspired neoliberal policy of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The programme of SAP could not solve the myriad of problems the economy was witnessing. These interrelated problems raised the issues of the role of the state in solving them. This study, argues that the structural imbalances in the Nigerian economy and reinforcement granted by the implementation of neoliberal economic policies in 1986 have, in theory been intended to remove the state from all but a minimal role in the economy. The Minimalist State Theory notes that the state has neither the management capability to run the economy nor any legitimate authority to do so. Consequently, administrative reforms were introduced to cope with the new role assigned to the private sector and the new Nigerian state. The article adopts a methodology involving a review of extant literature.

Introduction

The evolution of neoliberal state came as a result of economic crisis which was adopted as a panacea to problems of development in Nigeria. Thus, improving the efficiency and service delivery of public administration became the concern for good governance and administrative reforms in Nigeria. The connotation and composition of reforming the state and administrative reforms in Nigeria is inseparable from the nature and formation of the state. This is because the Nigerian state is an imposed one and a peripheral variant of capitalist type. This has the implication for political stability and development. Nigeria implemented sweeping reforms aimed at remedying political, economic and social problems in the country. Through public sector reform, the government attempted to implement its economic reform programmes and reposition the state for the work of a watchman. The emergence of fundamental ideological and paradigmatic shift in the 1980s in development thinking from a state-centered to a market-driven perspective has a significant impact and formed the basis for the prospects of sustainable development and administrative efficiency in Nigeria. This is mainly because the priorities of neoliberal policies are to expand market forces, facilitate open competition, enhance mass production, reduce the state's anti-poverty programmes, attract foreign investment, and maximize consumption not necessarily for the Nigerian state but for the advanced capitalist states and their companies. By 1986, the Babangida Regime adopted the World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) inspired neoliberal policy of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) because of the collapse of oil price in the international market. This policy gave primacy to free market enterprise, trade liberalization and economic deregulation, minimalist government involvement in the economy through streamlining government bureaucracies, divesting public investment, and the reduction of public expenditure for social services with little emphasis on income distribution objectives, equity, social justice, and restoration of full employment. In addition, inappropriate and ineffective policies of past Nigeria governments and the collapse of oil prices aggravated the economic decline in Nigeria in the early 1980s.

These interrelated problems raised the issues of the role of the state in solving them. This study argues that the structural imbalances in the Nigerian economy and reinforcement granted by the implementation of neoliberal economic policies such as privatization, deregulation and removal of state subsidies in 1986 have, in theory been intended to remove the state from all but a minimal role in the economy. The Minimalist State Theory notes that the state has neither the management capability to run the economy nor any legitimate authority to do so. Consequently, administrative reforms were introduced to cope with the new role assigned to the private sector and the Nigerian state. It teases out the general proposition that while the market is a necessary ingredient for development, it is not by itself a sufficient condition for prosperity. The state's role, policy framework, public sector, and leadership are equally relevant.

However, neo-liberalism represents both an ideological position and a policy perspective that endorses economic individualism based on market competition, encourage free trade and foreign investment, and oppose state intervention and state-run-welfare programmes (Haque, 2008:13) and this represents anti-state movement. Therefore, the emergence of a neoliberal state formation in various countries has significantly changed the meaning and composition of citizenship, provision of public welfare, especially in terms of the eroding rights or entitlements of citizens caused by the policy agenda pursued by such a state (Haque, 2008). There is an attack on public spending and the welfare state. The neoliberal philosophy insists that the most profitable returns to an economy occur when all activities and services are traded on the market (Iyayi, 2005:170). This is because the state is usually seen as an inefficient provider of services and greater productivity results from privatizing the interests of the state in service provision. The state is thus required to privatize, to disengage from or drastically reduce investments in social services such as education, health, water supply and infrastructures (Iyayi, 2005: 170). The attack on the welfare state and public spending as coordinated by the World Bank and IMF also requires a new administrative set up to cope with the new challenges thrown up by the new role assigned to the state and the market (private sector). In this vein, Egwu, (2004:42) posits that despite the historical reality of an underdeveloped and weak private entrepreneurship, a private sector-led development strategy has been foisted on the country. This primacy assigned to the private sector

has equally failed. This market-led alternative has also failed to deliver development and public welfare leading to many administrative reforms. This has happened not only because the market (private sector) is still underdeveloped in Nigeria, but also because this framework inherently leads to many people falling out of the social safety net previously provided by the state (Mbah, 2014:37). The sector is unproductive and corrupt and witnesses absence of notions of accountability in the conduct of its activities and contributes substantially to the economic, political and social crises that have beset Nigeria since independence.

The transition towards a neoliberal state and replacement of statist government by market regimes have been reinforced by the unprecedented globalization of capital, expansion of market ideology and influence of international agencies (Haque, 2008 :12). All these have implications for public administration in Nigeria. One of the manifestations of retrenchment of the state tendencies is the recent decline in its role as a direct producer and distributor of public goods and social services. Thus, retrenchment of the state seeks to limit the role of the state in economic and social activities. The article adopts a methodology involving a review of extant literature.

Understanding Neoliberal the State and Administrative Reforms in Nigeria

The Neoliberal State, what is it?

In developing countries, there are multiple interpretations of the nature of state formation, including the post-colonial state, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, the development state, and so on (Haque, 2008). Haque argues that since the early 1980s, the diversity in state formations has been replaced by a globally standardized state model based on neoliberal assumptions and policies. That is a state model that serves private capital, favours market institution, and imitates business management. Globally, this new emerging state formation has been portrayed as the contract state, the hollow state, the managerial state, the enabling state, the surveillance state, the skeleton state, and the minimal state or retrenched state (Clarke and Newman, 1997). Retrenchment of the state, therefore, refers to a kind of arrangements in which the welfare state rolls back its functions from the provision of basic social amenities in society in transition to neoliberal one. The welfare state is the state in which government owned and runs most public enterprises. In retrenching or rolling back the state, as canvassed by the Washington Collective,

the state also rolled itself away from the provision of the most basic of its functions—the provision of social welfare, security, development among others. Social welfare provisioning is usually done through the administrative machineries of government. The failure of the welfare state and its administrative machineries to guarantee social and public welfare has transformed public welfare from being a public good provided by the state to a private service which individuals and groups have to provide themselves, through various means. In many instances, the private sector has simply been mandated to drive economic development and provide public welfare; however, this sector is weak and underdeveloped in Nigeria and as such cannot drive development and the provision of public welfare, thus the administrative reforms. Consequently, state policies advanced retrenchment of the state both by feeding into international reforms and as the state responds to new requirements set by economic difficulties at home and the request of donor agencies.

Understanding Administrative Reform

The Nigerian public administration evolved from the colonial public administration with its historical British roots of independent, non-political and meritocratic administrative machinery for governing the country. Public administration constitutes all government departments and the people who work in them. They are institutions of the state which have the pivotal role of carrying out and advising on government policies.

Consequently, an administrative reform is a conscious, well-considered change that is carried out in a public sector organisation or system for the purpose of improving its structure, operation or the quality of its workforce

(www.dictionnaire.enap.ca/dictionnaire/docs/.../administrative_reform.pdf). In addition, every administrative reform has a political dimension, since the notion of improvement implies a choice of values by government to solve a problem of public interest. As a result, any ensuing change will be viewed as a reform or a setback depending on the ideology of the actor involved. For example, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the introduction of user fees for public services, programmes of public security reforms or access to information will be seen as reforms in Nigeria. Technically speaking, reforms to streamline bureaucratic procedures would likely

produce winners and losers. Ultimately, most reforms run up against resistance or inertia, thus forcing their proponents to engage in some measure of advocacy (Gow, 2010).

For Rogers, (2003), administrative reform entails a transfer of knowledge that goes beyond that which is generated in the course of regular operations. Such knowledge can come from internal studies but most often they originate externally. The most widespread phenomenon is emulation, that is, the adoption of an idea or practice that has been successfully implemented elsewhere (Rogers, 2003). Quite a few Nigerian reforms originate externally and have grown out of periods of political and economic crisis. Thus, in an atmosphere of economic downturn and recriminations over the poor performance of the Nigeria's economy, a set of reforms became necessary in order for the administrative machineries to play new roles created by the retrenchment of the Nigerian state.

Consequently, reforms have become inherited feature of public administration in Nigeria because of the constant growth of its functions and size for catering to ever increasing demands of society and to remain relevant in the changing times (Olaopa, 2015:4). Hence, reforming the administrative system is a complex rebuilding of it and modernizing of administrative procedures for effective and efficient public service for development of society (Olaopa, 2015:4). The ultimate objective of every reform programme is to either restore a system back to its original state of efficiency or take it beyond a present point to a future state where it is better able to respond to institutional challenges, internally and externally. Olaopa argues that when we think reform, we think performance and performance simply means getting the public service to work at its best possible optimal level (Olaopa, 2015).

To achieve this, there was a need to reform the administrative machinery as well as attitudes of the civil servants due to the effect of globalization to a vibrant and effective public administration. Public Sector Reforms was introduced to drive the human resource development process and form an effective resource utilization policy for development.

The public sector refers to all organizations that exist as part of government machinery for implementing policy decisions and delivering services that are of value to citizens. It is a mandatory institution under the Nigerian Constitution of 1999. Chapter VI of the Constitution, Executive, Part 1 (D) and Part II (C) provides for a public service at the federal and state levels of government. The Public Sector in Nigeria constitutes of: (1) The Civil Service, which is often referred to as the core service and is composed of line ministries and extra-ministerial agencies; and (2) The Public Service, which is composed of the enlarged public service, including the following: (a) Services of the state and national legislatures; (b) The judiciary; (c) The armed forces; (d) The police and other security agencies; (e) Paramilitary services (immigration, customs, prisons, etc); (f) 'Parastatals' and agencies including social service, commercially oriented agencies, regulatory agencies, educational institutions, research institutes, etc. The collapse of the public sector due to the collapse of the Nigerian economy in the early 1980s made it a paradoxical service: ignorant, unimaginative, and over-bloated and careerist.

Although the Nigerian public service has undergone changes and transformation over the years, unfortunately, successive reforms have not made significant impact to reengineer the public sector. Reforms were tailored towards achieving efficiency and effectiveness of the service because of the belief of successive governments that a thorough-bred public service was necessary for effective delivery of public good. Again, the public sector has continuously failed to deliver.

The Failure of the Welfare State and Neoliberal Economic Policies in Nigeria

A welfare state is a concept of government in which the state plays a key role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being of its citizens. It is based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Welfare_state). The welfare state involves a transfer of funds from the state, to the services provided (i.e., healthcare, education, etc.), as well as directly to individuals ("benefits"). It is funded through redistributionist taxation and is often referred to as a

type of "mixed economy. In most welfare states, substantial efforts are also made to mitigate socio-economic inequalities in primary income distribution through secondary redistribution, that is, government spending on social programmes funded by progressive income taxation.

But the Second Republic presided over the end of the oil boom and the fiscal irresponsibility of the Shagari Administration led to a rising debt crisis in Nigeria. As the Nigeria's foreign debt rose, its ability to position itself in opposition to Western powers and influence in the international arena faded. The oil glut that replaced the oil boom ushered in an era of cheap oil and economic crisis which made it difficult for Nigeria to use the revenue effectively. The Nigerian state became bankrupt and all sorts of reforms were introduced. The Nigerian welfare state failed to develop economically and industrially despite the fact that for years it had ample resources at its disposal to do so. Rather, it continued to create a culture of dependency and demands as well as corruption. Austerity and decline followed the new policy challenges of neo-liberalism which centres on the nature of the social contract between citizens and their governments.

However, the retrenchment of the welfare state came with the global ascendancy of the neoliberal policy regime since the 1980s. Since then, the gap between public wants and state policies in most parts of the developing countries has widened. The ensuing decline in policy representation and responsiveness and the meeting point between larger public interest as aggregated through public opinion and public policy has inspired public suspicion and constrained policy legitimacy, thereby resulting in tension between the government and the citizenry now alert in reminiscence of past failures and its negative welfare implications. Between 1978 and 1986, except for 1979 and 1985 when GDP showed positive growth, the Nigerian economy continued to register negative growth rates. There were also high inflation, high unemployment rate and fiscal imbalance. The stabilization and austerity measures of the Shagari Regime (1979-83) did not arrest the deepening crisis. The balance of payment did not improve. There was an increase in external loans which further accelerated the debt overhang situation. It was clear that the economy was suffering from stagflation. The country's industrial capacity utilization, which was 73.6 per cent in 1981, declined consistently during the period such that by 1989, it was 31 per cent. Manufacturing which grew at 14.6 per cent in 1981

reduced to 3.2 per cent in 1989(<http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/economyadv.asp?blurb=491>) This poor performance occurred despite various stabilization policies of the 1980s. The structure of the economy made it vulnerable to external shocks and policies. The problems were so severe that restructuring of the economy was inevitable (<http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/economyadv.asp?blurb=491>). Thus, a comprehensive economic reform package was introduced in 1986. The package aimed at changing and realigning aggregate domestic expenditure and production patterns so as to minimize dependence on imports; enhance the non-oil export base, and bring the economy back on the path of steady and balanced growth.

Consequently, as part of the efforts to reduce the size and the role of the state, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) call for the withdrawal of a host of subsidies that were introduced at the height of the Keynesian economics; the elimination of subventions to public enterprises and the privatization of the enterprises; and the jettisoning of the regime affixed exchange rates which the Keynesian economic theory had constructed as part of their strategy for introducing order and predictability into the international financial system and its replacement by a system of free floating exchange rates in which currencies find their level” (Olukoshi, and Nwoke 1994:14-15). Consequently, the role of the state in defining and protecting the public interest became whittled away by a global campaign of neo-liberalism through privatization and public sector commercialization driven by the needs of Trans-national Corporations and the advanced capitalist states (Mentan, 2004:4). At the structural level, the process of globalization has forced many developing countries to rethink and restructure the state-market relationship in their respective countries and to pay greater homage to market forces (Mentan. 2004). The rabidly anti-state, anti-welfare services and pro-market perspective of the economic reforms thus create capacity gap in the provision of public welfare and the need for administrative reforms in Nigeria due to the failure of the state and the market.

Before neo-liberalism was introduced in Nigeria, the emergence of crude petroleum as a major foreign exchange and government revenue earner was a relief to Nigeria in the pursuit of her development goals. The resources generated from crude oil sales were used in the provision of

social and economic infrastructure, which enhanced government delivery of services in Nigeria in the 1970s. Structurally, the economy was woven on the illusion of a large and sustained inflow of resources from crude oil exports. Consequently, the collapse of crude petroleum prices in the global oil market in the early 1980s showed the inherent structural defects of the economy. The retrenchment of the state with neoliberal economic policies was prescribed as a panacea for economic recovery and development.

From about 1981, however, the public sector began to experience an acute crisis. This led to the introduction of Economic Stabilization and Austerity Measures by the Shagari Administration through the Economic Stabilization Act of April 1982. The stabilization measures that were subsequently adopted by the military included the pruning down of expenditures and reduction in the size of the public sector. The dismal failure of this reform measures led to the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in the second half of the 1980s. The reform programmes under SAP which were both macro and sectoral were aimed at altering and restructuring the consumption and production patterns of the economy, as well as to eliminate price distortions and heavy dependence on the export of crude oil and import of consumer and producer goods (Donli, 2004:5). The main focal areas of the reforms were mainly fiscal policy and management, monetary policy, exchange rate management, regularization of foreign trade and management of external debts, among others.

The present economic reform policies of the Federal Government since 1999 appear to be a continuation of the previous reform measures. Obasanjo's administration in particular has pursued these measures with vigour, which is encapsulated particularly with the introduction of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (NEEDS). The reform measures of Obasanjo focused on the following major areas: private sector-led economic growth strategy, poverty alleviation, fiscal monetary incomes trade, and debts policies and broadening of the productive base of the economy. It is envisaged that its implementation would kick-start the economy and lead to sustainable growth process. But it has not, particularly in the health sector of the economy.

The neo-liberal economic framework emphasizes the contraction of state intervention in public policy-making and implementation. The neo-liberal economic framework thus emphasises privatization, deregulation, structural adjustment programmes, and free market as alternatives to the failure of the peripheral capitalist state like Nigeria. These have become important ingredients in the swing towards the market, which characterizes economic and administrative reforms in Nigeria in the recent past. The most important dimensions of the neoliberal economic policies in Nigeria which are relevant in understanding the need for administrative reforms are privatization, deregulation, and removal of state subsidies, among others.

Privatization

Nigeria went for privatization in the historic reforms of 1986. The official reason for privatization is that public enterprises are inefficient and therefore drain public funds. Privatization of some state-owned enterprises in some sectors was therefore needed to improve the efficiency of these enterprises, to curb corruption, and also to reduce the financial costs to the Federal Government (Okonjo-Iwela and Oasfo-Kwaako, 2007:13). They argue that between 1999 and 2006, about 116 public enterprises were privatized, including various loss-making government enterprises operating in industries such as aluminum, telecommunications, petrochemical, insurance, and hotel. In this process, Power Holding Company of Nigeria was unbundled into 18 companies responsible for power generation, transmission, and distribution (Okonjo-Iwela and Oasfo-Kwaako, 2007:13). The contradiction evident in the privatization process is the unprecedented high cost of public welfare services resulting in the exclusion of large segments of society even though a better deal for a better welfare services is said to be the aim of reform.

One of the theories that have been put forward to explain the superiority of private ownership over public ownership and the economic efficiency gains that are likely to emerge from the transfer of ownership and control of assets from the public to private investors is the Principal-Agent theory. The theory focuses on the differences in the monitoring mechanism and incentives which public and private managers face as agents of shareholders given welfare maximization for the former and profit maximization for the latter (Bos, 1991:21). The change in the

ownership from the public to the private sector has at least two effects: a change in the objective and from a weighted welfare function to profit maximization; and a change in the incentive structure by linking reward to the level of performance under private ownership (Chirwa, 2001:279). This shift towards profit maximization implies higher price particularly higher prices for public welfare services thus, sacrificing allocative efficiency.

Privatization programme in Nigeria is based mainly on the experience of Western Europe and North America without the necessary economic and political endowments which the Western nations enjoy. In particular, Nigeria lacks reasonable competitive domestic markets for goods and services, well developed capital markets with considerable breadth, depth and absorptive capacity, strong private sector and sound regulatory structures. The absence of these essential prerequisites makes achieving most of the benefits of privatization in Nigeria more difficult in the provision of public welfare. Data provided by the United Nations Development Programmes show that as a proportion of the total population, the number of the extreme poor in Nigeria was 28 percent in 1985, 40 percent in 1992 and 45 percent in 1996/97 and to 62.2 percent in 1999. By 1999 when Obasanjo came to power, about 70.2 percent of total populations of over 120 million people of Nigeria were living on an average of less than \$1 pay day (Mbah, 2014:28). Inflation has risen in leaps and bound and the value of the national currency (the Naira) has fallen dramatically from about \$1=₦3 in 1986, to \$1 = ₦ 140 in 2002 to \$1=₦ 155 in 2012 and \$1=₦270 in 2015.

Deregulation

Privatization has also been accompanied by deregulation of various economic sectors to encourage private sector participation, notably in telecommunications, power, and downstream petroleum sectors (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007:15). Neo-liberalism is insistent that economic progress is only possible through the deregulation and liberalization of trade, labour and prices (Iyayi, 2005:173). They posit that liberalization of the telecommunication sector has been particularly successful, resulting in an increase in the number of telephone lines in Nigeria from 500,000 landlines in 2001 to over 32 million GSM lines in 2007(Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007:13). The idea of deregulation is that fewer regulations will led to a raised level of

competitiveness, therefore higher productivity, more efficiency, and lower prices overall. The story of the telecom sector has remained a reference point for privatizing the enterprises in Nigeria, although the story is different in other sectors of the economy, especially in the downstream sector where prices of petroleum products have risen astronomically with its chain reaction on goods and people.

Hence, in reality, Nigerian economy is worse off because its markets access is reduced. Since the state has disengaged from or drastically reduced investment in social welfare services, reforming the administrative machinery has become an important institutional option in satisfying collective demands where deregulation has failed in public welfare services and welfare options (Mbah, 2014). Most often, private sector is profit-driven and, therefore, cannot actually provide social welfare services adequately without considering its profit margin. Thus, the for-profit motive and high fees in the face of high rate of poverty limit access to public welfare services. Government incapacitation under the present economic reforms as well as weak and underdeveloped private sector and its profit-minded nature have created a condition in which the provision of public welfare under the neoliberal state and have led to several administrative reforms to make it development driven machinery.

So what will be the role of Public Service in the new situation?

It is important to note that the policy environment before the administrative reform was introduced in Nigeria is critical in determining the direction and philosophy of the neoliberal state. The overriding direction and philosophy of the neoliberal state and the administrative reforms is the constraints on the administrative apparatuses of the state and the failure to recognise the importance of the state as a business participant in ensuring real and enduring economic development (Amadi, 2004:3). Since the state was meant to act as watchman, both the state and reform measures were meant to align incentives to produce desirable outcomes and achieve economic goals that leads from underdeveloped to developed economy. This seems to have an ideological conflict. First, while public service has been advocated for reform, people operating the system have not been reformed themselves and as such the ideological conflict between the market and the public service continue to exist. Second, the market has not been

freed from social and cultural restrictions to reproduce itself and lead to development in Nigeria. The public sector reform involving the privatization of state owned enterprises is assumed to increase efficiency and effectiveness in delivering development in Nigeria; however, it is creating a new set of neoliberal technocrats who do not add new value to the public service. Both the neoliberal state and administrative reforms envisage a new vision of development for Nigeria. Admittedly, this new vision requires the government to model “enterprise competition and efficiency at all levels, equity and care for the weak and vulnerable”, entrench a value system for the public service and fight corruption (Amadi, 2004:33). However, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as well as some other development institutions have taken over the administrative reforms as they insist on restructuring, right-sizing and re-professionalizing public institutions so that they can deliver efficient services and goods. Surprisingly, the politics of administrative reform measures have always overlooked politics of the reform because of shortsightedness of the Nigerian government. In this vein, Amadi (2004:22) posits that government overlook of the political context of the malfunctioning of the public service because of the reform, does not address the substantive issue of equity and social justice in the light of the distributive consequences of the restructure which have caused social dislocations during implementation. People blame the failure of the public service on government. But the mere introduction of reform does not guarantee efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity. Politics, corruption and other internal crises may equally play prominent roles in undermining efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity in public administration in Nigeria.

The Nexus between the Retrenched State and Administrative Reforms in Nigeria

With regard to the minimalist scope of the neoliberal state, there have been some major government initiatives in Nigeria to streamline the public sector by cutting expenditures, reducing public employees, and withdrawing its active economic role (Haque, 2008). This resulted in the administrative reforms that followed the introduction of the neoliberal state due to the failure of the welfare state, not minding that the neoliberal state has not done well equally.

These reforms have become inevitable because the civil service of any nation is the centrepiece of its administrative activities and performance and its output mirrors the performance of the ruling government charged with the formation and implementation of public policies. An effective administrative system is important for both political and economic development. It also helps to fit those developments to people's needs and preferences. The state within which local administrative system operates is crucial to meeting these objectives. The economic philosophy of the Federal Government since 1986 is hinged on the market: "that government has no business in business". Therefore, all the existing government projects, plants, enterprises, refineries and shareholdings in industries, trade, banking, finance and agriculture must be privatized and sold, so that government, particularly the Federal Government, can concentrate on governance, forgetting that a government that cannot run an industry successfully cannot govern efficiently (Aluko, 2007:1).

The growing concern with administrative reforms in Nigeria since independence has several clear origins. First, there was the experience of certain early programmes undertaken by the public sector. For instance, Olaopa (2015) posits that one is the crash of localization programmes demanded in the civil service immediately after independence. These raised questions about the content of the training programmes. The latter were necessarily dependent on overseas technical assistance and this meant the employment of Western technique and procedures. Disappointing outcomes of local techniques tended to be associated with continued reliance on inherited and foreign methods (Olaopa, 2015).

Second, the early planning experiences suggested that the Nigerian public service was not ideally geared in terms of structures and procedures to the new planning roles for development. For instance, training programmes tended to be rather orthodox and preoccupied with the internal aspects of public administration rather than the administrative requirements of development plans, programmes, and projects. A second and related condition of the current reformist mood is the changing role of the state and the public sector themselves, both with respect to the adoption of new functions (Olaopa, 2015). .

A third catalyst of the reformist trend has been the experimentation taking place elsewhere in Europe and America in the name of globalization and in the machinery of government and the feeling that civil service was falling behind in terms of innovations and performance as well as driving development. Indeed, the collapse of the Nigerian economy and the advent of military rule have helped much in creating a reformist atmosphere. The history of Nigeria's reform experiment becomes important once we see it as the ongoing attempt, in administrative terms, to come to term with the possibility of redeeming Nigeria from its post-colonial deficits. The need for administrative reform is therefore premised on the urgent necessity of transforming the civil service into an effective institution that would foreground the nation's search for an infrastructural revolution that would alleviate the years of denigration Nigerians have suffered under colonial rule (Olaopa, 2015).

The post colonial Nigerian state has been under the attack of serious socio-political, economic, and administrative pathologies. The state apparatuses, the political and administrative institutions have been for years facing chaotic and perpetual structural dilemmas because there is no attempt at restructuring it after independence in order to drive development. The Nigerian civil service was also oversized and poorly remunerated, resulting in poor service delivery (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007:14). The findings of the two scholars show that there was rapid public sector recruitment under the military administrations which resulted in an oversized and under-skilled work force in which employees often did not have the appropriate technical skills needed for their assignments. They found out that about 70 percent of workers in the Ministry of Finance were low-level staff clerks, cleaners and administrative staff with a secondary school education or its equivalent, 13 percent was university graduates and only 8 percent had degrees related to economics, finance or accounting (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007:14). Worse still, the service remains inefficient and bedevilled by weak governance structure, red-tapism, weak accountability, low professional standards, waste and corruption, poor productivity, lack of control, redundancy and over-bloated staff structure (Salisu, 2001:1).

However, the beginning of the 1980s especially with the Babangida Administration witnessed a decisive swing in the dominant intellectual attitude and development strategy away from the state initiative and ownership and the rolling back of the spheres of the state action. This is because despite Nigeria's huge oil resources, its economic performance has been startlingly poor. The introduction of SAP in 1986 and the subsequent retrenchment of the Nigerian state led to the first administrative reform under the retrenched state. The first was the 1988 civil service reform under General Ibrahim Babangida's administration. The general reforms embarked upon by the civil service administration would suggest the world wide triumph of market force as dominant means of resource allocation in the society. However, beginning with the Nigerianization Policy, which favoured representativeness over merit, the decline of the public service was accelerated with the destruction of the Weberian administrative structure by the SAP of Babangida's Administration. These reforms starting from the Morgan Commission of 1963 to the Allision Ayida Panel of 1994, tried quite a lot at improving the Civil Service in Nigeria. But by 2005, it was obvious that a result oriented civil service had not emerged in Nigeria. Again, the civil service was also oversized and poorly remunerated, resulting in poor service delivery. The quality of the Civil Service was also severely hampered by cultural, structural, institutional and other management defects. Many administrative reforms have taken place, such as bank sector reforms, the security sector reform, and local government reform, insurance, trade among others.

However, due to limited space, only a few of these civil service reforms will be discussed. In this light, civil service reform began with five pilot ministries and subsequently was extended to nine Ministries, Department and Agencies (MDAs) (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007:14). In each instance according to them, internal consultations were made while verifications were conducted to update personnel records and payroll data. Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, (2007:14) therefore, argue:

Organizational structures for the performing ministries were reviewed and rationalized, while the appropriate professional skills needed were identified. Redundancy packages and retraining programmes were offered to several staff. A total of 35,700 officials have been severed from the civil service at an estimated cost of about N26 billion (US\$203 million), while 1,000 high flying university graduates are being recruited. In the process of restructuring, an estimated 8,000 ghost workers were expunged from the government payroll.

However, in Nigeria, civil service reform has been one of the most difficult areas due to entrenched resistance and self- preservation. In this process, the direction of reform has been set and entrenched warfare will need to continue according to Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, (2007:15) through labour unions for years to come.

The 1988 Babangida Reform

By far, the most significant of reforms under the neoliberal state is the 1988 civil service reform undertaken by the Military Regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. The main provisions of the 1988 civil service reform include structural reorganization, professionalisation and the enforcement of public accountability. As of the time of the reform, the following defects were associated with the civil service: undue importance accorded the generalists at the expense of the professionals; profligacy among public officers; nonchalant attitude among civil servants to their duties; and corruption. Measures taken to rectify these defects by the reform include: the adoption of a uniform structure for the civil service nationwide; the harmonization of power with responsibility; the streamlining of the span of control of officers to not more than eight units; the expansion of the powers of internal audit units complemented by an audit alarm system; the mandating of chief executives to submit progress reports on their ministry to the president; and the rationalization of promotion criteria for public officers. These provisions are little more than the rehashing of past legislations, which failed to achieve positive results, not because they were faulty in precept but because they were sacrificed to sloppy implementation (Dlakwa, 2006).

Until the 1988 reforms, the civil service was organized strictly according to British traditions: it was apolitical, civil servants were expected to serve every government in a non-partisan way, and the norms of impersonality and hierarchical authority were well entrenched (http://www.photius.com/countries/nigeria/government/nigeria_government_the_civil_service.html). Before this period, the Nigerian public servant maintained a character and operated strictly as an outpost of the West Ministers Administration. The idea of the 1988 reform was to give public service a new direction by introducing various criteria measures to reverse the decline in productivity, divided loyalty, redundancy, and indiscipline among others. The highlights are as follows;

- i) The post of permanent secretary is political and they are to retire with government that appoints them.
- ii) Each ministry shall be professionalised, and officers between the generalist and specialist should choose ministry of their choice.
- iii) Ministries should hire and fire
- iv) Each ministry shall be subdivided into Divisions, Units and Branches.
- v) Administrative and professional carders shall bear functional titles. (Essentials of civil service, 1988)

The 1988 reforms formally recognised the politicisation of the upper echelons of the civil service and brought about major changes in other areas. The main stated objective of the reforms was "to ensure a virile, dynamic and result-oriented civil service." As a result, ministers or commissioners vested with full executive powers were fully accountable for their ministries or commissions. The Director General had become a political appointee whose length of tenure was dependent on that of the government of the day in practice, this meant that directors general need not be career civil servants, thereby reducing the latter's career prospects. Each ministry had been professionalized so that every official, whether specialist or generalist, made his career entirely in one ministry, whereas previously an official could move among ministries. A new department--the Presidency--comprising top government officials was created at the federal level to coordinate the formulation of policies and monitor their execution, thus making it a clearing house between the president and all federal ministries and departments. The reforms created a new style of civil service (http://www.photius.com/countries/nigeria/government/nigeria_government_the_civil_service.html). The Philips Commission Report, which generated the 1988 Reform Recommendation, was forced by inevitable global trajectory to revisit the managerial revolution in administration through its attempt to lay the foundation of a professionalised civil service. Professionalisation was thus tied to specialization. Unfortunately, rather than professionalising, the reform entrenched a politicisation of the workforce, especially the status of the permanent secretary which became a political appointment. The conception of professionalism was also curious because it was taken as a function of the location and time span of an officer in a particular

ministry (Olaopa, 2015). However, the current civilian administration has tried to change the 1988 system by insulating the top echelon of the civil service from politics. In this way, the government has designated Permanent Secretaries as Accounting Officers as opposed to the practice under the military in which Ministers were the Account Officers (Egwu, 2004:37).

The Ayida Reform of 1994

Allison Ayida Civil Service Reform was set up barely a decade of operation of The 1988 Reform. General Sani Abacha came into power and introduced another reform following the opposition raised by top Civil Servants on the politicization of the post of permanent secretaries. The reform panel was headed by Allison Ayida in 1995. The Abacha Regime discovered that the Nigeria civil service was dying gradually due to the effects of the 1988 reforms. The panel was meant to examine and properly define the role of the civil service as an executive arm of government, examine various provisions of the Civil Service Decree NO. 43 of 1988 and make recommendations on how to improve performance, efficiency and commitment in the service, make appropriate recommendations on how to raise the morale of the workers, examine the problem of co-ordination and accountability in the ministries; make recommendations, examine the abolition of the office of the head of service and the pooling system etc.

The Ayida Panel was supposed to act in a review capacity to interrogate the recommendations of the Philips Commission of 1988 as a means by which the system can be reinvented. But it reinvented the pre-1988 civil service system and its managerial deficit. The Ayida Panel did not have a concrete agenda of reinvention, so it recommended a regression back to the status quo ante. ‘Challenging the status quo,’ according to Gary Hamel, ‘has to be the starting point for anything that goes under the label of strategy.’ While the Ayida Panel failed at doing this, it becomes the administrative standard by which to assess the remaining four reform strategies that define the democratic dispensation in Nigeria—the Obasanjo Renewal Programme, the Yar’Adua Civil Service Reform Programme, the Transformation Agenda of the Jonathan Administration, and President Muhammadu Buhari’s ongoing Change Agenda (Olaopa, 2015).

The four reform agenda are founded on the fundamental principle that no transformation of the Nigerian state would be possible without a capable, efficient and corruption-free public service. The Obasanjo, Yar'Adua and Jonathan Administrations therefore accepted the reform blueprint contained in the National Strategy for Public Service Reform (NSPSR) which projected the vision of a world-class public service that is professionalised enough to deliver government policies and programmes. Much as these reform agenda are beautiful programmes of renewal and revitalisation that has the benefits of administrative hindsight, visions are often undermined by reality. And the present reality is that the civil service system in Nigeria, in spite of the multitude of beautiful reform visions and strategies, is still struggling to deliver democratic dividends to millions of Nigerians who are sighing under the terrible burden of poverty. The Nigerian Civil Service is still far from being a world class public service (Olaopa, 2015).

Civil Service Reform under President Obasanjo (1999-2007)

The inception of transition to civilian rule that led to the emergence of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 as the Nigerian Head of state came with fulfilling 'electioneering' promise of reforming the civil service and other public institutions with a view to expunging extant rules, procedures and regulations that frustrate effective service delivery consistent with modern systems in the Civil Service (Bayo, 2012:25). Bayo posits that the economic philosophy under which civil service reform under Obasanjo regime hinged was on market: 'that government has no business in businesses. Hence, all the existing government projects, plants, enterprises, refineries and shareholdings in industries, trade, banking, finance and agriculture must be privatized and sold, so that government, particularly the Federal Government, can concentrate on governance. This was a process of minimising the role of the state in public welfare provisioning. The major thrust of Civil Service Reform under Obasanjo regime can be summarised thus:

Pension Reform

In 2004, General Olusegun Obasanjo Regime enacted a law to decentralise and privatise pension administration in Nigeria through the Pension Reform Act 2004. By this Act, the National Pension Commission (PENCOM) was constituted as a regulatory authority to oversee and check

the activities of 25 registered Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs) (Bayo, 2012:26). This new pension scheme is in line with the regime's neo-liberal policies in all areas of life. Before the 2004 new scheme, there had been in existence the Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF) and in 1962 the creation of National Provident Fund as compulsory savings for workers in both public and private sectors (Bayo, 2012). According to Bayo, this old pension scheme was inherited from British colonialism, which purposely designed it for expatriates. It later accommodated local public sector. The old pension scheme of 1962, as amended in 1974 and 1993, was very relatively favourable to workers. It was a non-contributory benefit scheme that allowed government to allocate specific resources to the consolidated revenue meant to pay pensioners. This made public sector attractive to workers since their old age could be guaranteed after quitting service, especially in a country where there is no social benefit for the unemployed and senior citizens. The Contributory Pension Reform which is one of the key elements in the Public Service Reforms was to ensure that persons who have worked in the public and private sectors receive their retirement benefits as and when it is due. Under this new scheme, a compulsory contribution of 7.5% of workers' basic salary and 7.5% of the same from employers of labour will now become pension of workers after retirement. The scheme accommodates workers in both public and private sectors with minimum of five employees, and only pensioners and those with 3 years to retirement as from 2004 are exempted (Salami and Odeyemi 2012:3, cited in Bayo, 2012). The new scheme, therefore, applies only to the workers from 2008. The analysis of the Pension Reform Act suggests that the new pension scheme is not uniform to all categories of workers. While 7.5% of every worker's salary is deducted as his/her contribution to pension with the employers remitting 7.5%, totaling 15%, only 2.5% is deducted from armed forces workers while their employer government remits 12.5%, totaling 15%. Again, judiciary workers under Section 8 (2) of the 2004 Pension Reform Act are exempted from the new scheme entirely (Bayo, 2012:31). Bayo further argues that this Contributory Pension Scheme adopted the Chilean pension system put in place by the brutal military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in 1974.

Monetisation Policy

The new monetization policy which is one of the key elements in the Public Service Reforms that will help to ascertain the true cost of spending that government officials used in maintaining governmental positions (Bayo, 2012:34). The aim of the policy is to prevent and thwart government officials from using public money for personal gain. Before the implementation of this policy, public office holders and civil servants had numerous fringe benefits attached to the condition of service and remuneration package. However, with the new monetisation policy that was passed into law vis-à-vis passage of certain Political and Judicial Office Holders Acts 2002, it is legally stated that monetization of the salaries and allowances of all categories of Federal Public Servants that were formally paid in kinds be converted to cash by the Salary and Wage Commission (Stephen 2011: 61 cited in Bayo, 2012)). Under this scheme, 'the government's houses, cars, furniture etc which were for the use of bureaucrats and other Political Office Holders were to be converted into private property. The policy makers believed that the scheme will encourage private initiatives and facilitate creativity and motivation and most importantly, improve the service of quality delivery, promote patriotism and efficiency among civil servants'. The monetization policy of Obasanjo regime which was borrowed from the United States primarily to curb excesses and save money for solid development purposes, noted for cutting unnecessary and unproductive spending by the political office holders and top echelon of the civil service as well as reducing the burden of providing basic amenities for political office holders have contributed significantly to the continued increase in government recurrent expenditure. What turned out to be the greatest undoing of the policy is that it was characterised by fraud and corruption (Bayo, 2012).

Restructuring of Pilot Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs)

Bayo, (2012) argues that one of the cardinal policies in the public service reform is the re-organisation of MDAs for effective service delivery. Obasanjo regime observed that the federal bureaucracies have considerable number of duplicating and overlapping functions among agencies, and among tiers and arms of government. In doing this, the Federal Government established the Bureau of Public Service Reforms (BPSR) in September 2003 as an independent agency in the Presidency to ensure the re-organisation and the re-assigning of all Ministries,

Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of all arms and branches of the federal government (El-Rufai, 2011 cited in Bayo, 2012). The restructuring policy ensures that all MDAs structure to have between 4 and 8 departments and 2-4 divisions per department. These were approved and applicable to all MDA thereafter.

Down-sizing and Payroll Reform

Bayo, (2012:34) states that one of the complaints about Nigerian civil service is that it is over-bloated, large and unwieldy as many workers performing duties that should have been done by few persons. In correcting this, according to Bayo, Obasanjo Regime began down-sizing of staff across all MDAs following their view of three critical questions: how many people do we need to do the job and what type and with what skills? And, what is the best way to get this work done? (Eme and Ugwu, 2011:48). During the down- sizing process, it was observed that ‘the civil service was rapidly ageing, mostly untrained and largely under-educated. Their average age then was 42 years and over 60% were over 40 years. Less than 12% of the public servants held university degrees or equivalent. Over 70% of the services were of the junior grades 01-06, of sub- clerical and equivalent skills’ (El -Rufai, 2011). The cleaning up of civil service vis-à-vis down-sizing began with the headcount of all civil servants across all MDAs (Bayo, 2012).

Steven Oronsaye Panel 2010-2012

In order to deepen the neo-liberal reform process of his predecessor, President Umaru Musa Yar’adua inaugurated Steven Oronsaye Committee for reform of Federal Civil Service in 2010 (Bayo, 2012: 35). According to Bayo, Mr Steven Oronsaye who was a new Head of Civil Service of the Federation at that time was mandated to review organisational structure of the service in line with the previous reform exercise. The Committee recommended that permanent secretaries and directors (but not assistant directors) will serve for an initial period of four years extendable, subject to good performance, to eight years, irrespective of their ages and years in service. So far, the panel report has been gazetted and implemented, while the affected officials have been eased out of the Federal Civil Service. However, following the death of President Umaru Musa Yar’adua in May 2010, his deputy Goodluck Jonathan was inaugurated as the Nigerian President. He retained the Steven Oronsaye Committee, and renamed it: Presidential

Committee on the Rationalization and Restructuring of Federal Government Parastatals, Commissions and Agencies to review the structure of public institutions in March 2011. The Committee was given the following terms of reference:

- To study and review all previous reports/records on the restructuring of Federal Government Parastatals and advise on whether they are still relevant.
- To examine the enabling Acts of all the Federal Agencies, Parastatals, and Commissions and classify them into various sectors.
- To examine critically, the mandates of the existing Federal Agencies, Parastatals and Commissions and determine areas of overlap or duplication of functions and make appropriate recommendations to restructure, merge or scrap to eliminate such overlaps, duplication or redundancies.
- To give advice on any other matter(s) that is or are incidental to the foregoing which may be relevant to the desire of Government to prune the cost of governance (Bayo, 2012:36).

Steven Oronsaye committee in its 800-page report submitted to President Goodluck Jonathan posited that the existing 541 MDAs in the country, only 163 deserve to exist. The Panel recommended that: the existing 263 government's statutory agencies in the country be reduced to 161; the abolition of 38 agencies, merger of 52 and reversion of 14 agencies to departments in the relevant ministries; and the management audit of 89 agencies capturing biometric features of staff as well as the discontinuation of government funding of professional bodies/councils. The committee report, no doubt, is a rehash of the White Paper on the Ahmed Joda Panel Report on the Review, Harmonisation and Rationalisation of Federal Government Parastatals (Bayo, 2012:36). With the advent of democratic governance following the exit of the military in governance in 1999, reform of the public sector in Nigeria in improving its efficiency and service delivery has become central to the concern for good governance and administrative reforms. In recognition of this, successive governments have embarked on the review of the structures and

reward system of the public service (Egwu, 2004: 37). There is the need to address policy issues underlying administrative reforms in Nigeria.

Conclusion

We have demonstrated how the failure of the welfare state led to the introduction of neoliberal state and policies which advocated the retrenchment of the state in Nigeria. The failure of the retrenched state has also led to many administrative reforms. Thus, administrative reforms in Nigeria have not been a successful story. This failure manifest at four (4) levels: (i) failure to anticipate problem before it surfaced; (ii) failure to see a problem for what it is when it surfaced; (iii) the tendency to ignore the problem even when properly perceived; and (iv) failure of attempts to resolve the problem (Olaopa, 2015:4). Policy failure in reform implementation is further complemented by operational and strategic disconnection. As far as implementation is concerned, reform plans must not just be dedicated to the analysis of data about how to go about reforming; rather, it must ensure that the data translate to action plan which will bring about growth, increased productivity, and quality of goods and services and overall development.

Reform implies the willingness to think strategically. Olaopa, (2015:4) argues that thinking strategically involves asking fundamental questions: (a) Can we identify how we are going to turn the plan into specific results for growth and productivity? (b) Are we staffed with the right kinds of people to execute the plan? (c) If not, what are we going to do about it? (d) How do we make sure the operating plan has sufficient specific programs to deliver the outcomes to which we were committed? (Olaopa, 2015:5). In asking these questions, the involvement of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of government must be in our minds. This is because they have inevitable roles to play in reform failure. Admittedly, Olaopa argues that this is precisely to the extent that the operating systems by which MDAs convert policies to action are inherently faulty. Within the Nigerian context, the MDAs are caught between two different and incongruous administrative business models—the Weberian and the neoliberal—operating side by side and simultaneously (Olaopa, 2015:5). This effectively translates, according to Olaopa, also, into worries about systemic capability and capacity issues involving (i) input process-oriented business model; (ii) skills and competency gaps; (iii) lack of clarity on actions required

to execute national plan; (iv) poor alignment between national plans, sectoral activities and departmental/unit programmes; (v) unclear accountabilities for execution; (vi) inadequate performance monitoring and reporting; (vii) organizational silos and culture blocking of execution; and (viii) undefined rewards and sanctions (Olaopa, 2015:5). These have undermined administrative reforms in Nigeria.

Another huge challenge is diversion of funds. Nigeria was ranked 142 out of 144 countries on the index of diversion of public funds on the World Economic Forum Index of official corruption (cited in Igbuzo, 2014). There is the challenge of human resource management and performance management. For Igbuzor, human resource management in the public sector is characterised by weak incentive structure. The World Economic Forum Global Competitive Report ranks Nigeria 125th out of 134 countries in the extent to which connected individuals and firms influence government policies and the award of contracts. Performance management is the process of assessing and managing individual performance of workers. It requires supervisors to plan, explain, clarify, test for agreement, monitor and provide feedback. Performance management in the public sector is poor and ineffective (Igbuzo, 2014). From the above, it is clear that the provision of public service directly by government institutions or through creating enabling environment for private service providers involves processes and activities. Poor service delivery is primarily caused by problems in the service delivery process.

This is why arresting the declining public service quality requires dealing with the problems in the service delivery process. There is no doubt that the Nigerian public sector performance is weak despite increased public expenditure. Therefore, meaningful development outcomes cannot be achieved without a good balance of efficiency, effectiveness and equity. Any reform that emphasises efficiency at the expense of effectiveness and equity cannot achieve much. While efficiency is the attribute of a well functioning market, effectiveness and equity are primary functions of the state. This underscores the need to have good hybrid of the market, a well functioning state and good administrative set up to drive development as well as effective and efficient public service delivery in Nigeria. Consequently, the type of state formation has a key role to play in the design, implementation and monitoring of reforms. Public human resource

management reforms are needed to support the structural reform agenda and lay the groundwork for strides towards a more efficient and effective State. Effective reform of the State requires attention to a range of interdependent issues aimed at strengthening public administration capacities, resilience and leadership for the reform tasks ahead. The neoliberal state has played a critical role in orchestrating administrative reforms in Nigeria.

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